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Two studies investigated the role of the need for cognitive closure in implicit and 
explicit rule learning. I generally hypothesized the existence of a relationship between 
the need for closure (NFC) and the learning of rules moderated by the type of 
learning, implicit versus explicit, occurring (Hypothesis 1). More specifically, I 
predicted that high (vs. low) NFC would predict better performance on an explicit 
rule learning task (Hypothesis 2) but worse performance on an implicit rule learning 
task (Hypothesis 3). I tested these hypotheses both by measuring the NFC as a stable, 
dispositional trait variable (Study 1) and manipulating it as a transient state variable 
(Study 2). The findings of Study 1 provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 but not 
Hypothesis 3. The findings of Study 2 provide support for Hypothesis 3 but not 
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Chapter 1: Background and Theoretical Rationale 
 Consider the following four scenarios. Upon catching a glimpse of his mom in 
the next room, a young child decides against sneaking a cookie from the pantry. A 
college student with a fifteen-minute lunch break opts for the shorter of two serving 
lines in her school’s dining hall. A doctor diagnoses his patient with appendicitis. A 
rumored bankruptcy compels an investor to sell off all of her stock in the troubled 
company. 
On the face of it, the decisions made by the players in each of these scenarios 
have very little in common; a child’s resisting of cookie jar temptation seems worlds 
away a medical diagnosis. But though these decisions differ considerably in both their 
content and consequences, the transformational, rule-governed process that underlies 
them is one and the same. 
When forming judgments, we use inference rules of a propositional logic 
nature to draw conclusions based upon the evidence at hand (Kruglanski & 
Gigerenzer, Under Review). Such rules follow an “If E then C” structure, where “E” 
is the evidence (cues) and “C” is the resulting conclusion (judgment). If we revisit my 
opening example adopting this propositional framework, we can easily identify the 
ruleful nature of each decision.  
The boy likely decided not to take the cookie because he believed that if he 
did, then his mom would be upset, while the co-ed’s choice of cafeteria line probably 
rested on the assumption that if the line is shorter, then the wait, too, will be shorter. 
The doctor’s diagnosis was (hopefully) informed by medical training dictating that if 




appendicitis. And the investor’s decision to unload her stock presumably was driven 
by a belief that if the company filed for bankruptcy, then its stock value would 
depreciate considerably.  
That rules are crucial to everyday decision-making is evidenced by a number 
of phenomena. Take, for one, the use of heuristics – simple (and, thus, cognitively 
efficient) decision rules we use to render judgments in the face the incomplete 
information. When utilizing the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), 
for example, individuals base their judgment regarding the likelihood of an event 
occurring on the ease with which they can bring an example of the event to mind. 
That is, they subscribe to the belief that if an example of an event is more easily 
recalled, then the event must occur more frequently. 
The act of stereotyping can also be conceptualized as a rule-governed process, 
as a stereotype is simply a belief that “if person X belongs to social category Y, then 
person X must possess trait Z”. Thus, when a stereotype is employed, the social 
category Y serves as a cue, or evidence, of Person X’s possession of trait Z, which the 
person doing the stereotyping uses to render his or her stereotypic judgment. Finally, 
propositional logic has even been implicated in perception (e.g., Kleffner & 
Ramachandran, 1992; Pizlo, 2001; Rock, 1983), insofar as the brain makes 
unconscious inferences based on the visual stimuli to which it is exposed. 
So, how is it that we come to acquire these rules that so pervade human 
decision-making? It has been demonstrated that rules can be learned both explicitly 
and implicitly (e.g., Reber, 1976). Whereas explicit learning is hypothesis-driven 




and produces knowledge that the individual is cognizant of, implicit learning occurs 
through the passive involvement of the individual, takes place entirely outside of his 
or her awareness, and produces knowledge that the individual can apply, but cannot 
directly access (Dienes & Perner, 2002). According to Cleeremans (2002), learning 
must satisfy three criteria in order to be considered implicit: (1) there is neither the 
intention to learn, (2) nor awareness of learning on the part of the individual, and (3) 
he or she finds it difficult to express (e.g., verbally articulate) the knowledge that is 
being drawn upon.  
Although interest in learning without awareness dates back to the 1930s (e.g., 
Jenkins, 1933; Thorndike & Rock, 1934), the study of implicit learning is generally 
recognized to have truly begun with Reber’s seminal artificial grammar learning 
(AGL) studies of the 1960s and 1970s (Matthews & Roussel, 1997; French & 
Cleeremans, 2002). Artificial grammars are highly simplified analogs of natural 
language wherein constructed rule systems govern the combination of a set of letters 
or other symbolic elements (Allen & Reber, 1999). In the first part of Reber’s (1967, 
Study 2) AGL study, participants memorized letter strings derived from a set of such 
artificial grammar rules. Upon completion of this task, participants were informed of 
the fact that those letter strings had been generated from a specific set of rules, and 
were then asked to categorize a set of novel letter strings as either adhering to those 
same rules, or not.  
Some of the letter strings participants were asked to classify in the testing 
phase of the study were, in fact, ruleful; others were not. Reber demonstrated that 




above chance rate yet were unable to verbalize the knowledge they used to do so. 
From this, he concluded that participants had “implicitly” learned the grammar rules.  
The existence of an implicit process through which rules can be learned makes 
a great deal of intuitive sense, as a need to explicitly learn every rule used to render 
judgments would undoubtedly prove extremely cognitively taxing and, consequently, 
severely impede one’s decision-making capabilities. Unlike explicit learning, implicit 
learning is not affected by anxiety (Rathus, Reber, Manza, & Kushner, 1994) or time 
pressure (Turner & Fischler, 1993), and is uncorrelated with IQ (Reber, Walkenfeld, 
& Hernstadt, 1991). And populations with explicit learning deficits, such as 
Alzheimer’s (Reber, Martinez, & Weintraub, 2003) and Parkinson’s patients (Witt, 
Nuhsman, & Deuschf, 2002), anterograde amnesiacs (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), and 
young adults with mental retardation (Atwell, Conners & Merrill, 2003), have been 
shown to have relatively intact implicit learning capabilities compared to the normal 
population. Thus, the ability to implicitly learn rules appears to be highly functional 
and adaptive. 
Given the importance of rules to human functioning, it is important to explore 
factors that may influence the explicit and implicit processes through which they are 
acquired. The present research examined one such factor – epistemic motivation or, 
more specifically, the need for cognitive closure. 
The need for cognitive closure, henceforth referred to simply as the need for 
closure (NFC), describes a preference for a quick, definitive answer to a question 
(i.e., “closure”) over prolonged uncertainty or ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1989). 




them to reach closure and “freeze” on the rendered judgment such that the closure is 
retained (Kruglanski, 1996). Given this concern with the acquisition of evidence for 
the quick formation of a judgment, the NFC seems to hold natural implications for the 
learning of rules. 
The need for closure can be either manipulated (i.e., situationally induced) as 
a transient state variable or measured as a stable individual differences variable (for 
the scale, see Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Examples of situational manipulations 
that have proven successful in eliciting a heightened need for closure include time 
constraints (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), ambient noise (Kruglanski, Webster, & 
Klem, 1993), mental fatigue (Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996) and relative task 
dullness (Webster, 1993a). Webster and Kruglanski’s (1994) 42-item scale measures 
the NFC as a single factor construct with five domains: (a) a desire for order and 
structure in one’s environment, (b) a discomfort with ambiguity, (c) a preference for 
decisiveness, (d) a desire for predictability about the future, and (e) closed-
mindedness. 
Given this conceptualization of the NFC, we would expect rules to be 
particularly appealing to individuals high in the NFC insofar as they provide 
structure, order, and predictability – all things an individual with a heightened need 
for closure seeks. NFC’s positive relationship to, at the individual level, Right Wing 
Authoritarianism (Roets & Van Hiel, 2006) and, at the group level, the emergence of 
autocratic leadership styles (Pierro, Mannetti, De Grada, Livi, & Kruglanski, 2003) 
appears to support this. Moreover, because high NFC individuals prefer to truncate 




fewer hypotheses (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987), the NFC should engender a 
preference for well-defined decision rules, which would enable them to do this with 
greater ease. 
There is evidence to suggest that individuals high in the NFC may not only 
have a stronger preference for rules, but may also over-rely on them. For one, 
individuals high in the NFC stereotype more than their low NFC counterparts 
(Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Dijksterhuis, Van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 
1996). A general tendency to over-rely on rules might also underlie the finding that 
the NFC is accompanied by a heightened striving for consensus in group settings, as 
demonstrated by elevated tendencies for individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC to 
reject opinion deviates (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991) and bring up unique 
information during group discussion, presumably for the purpose of reaching 
consensus more quickly (Webster, 1993b). These findings could be construed as an 
overreliance on the consensus heuristic, or the belief that “consensus implies 
correctness” (see Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987), among high NFC individuals. 
Although, based on the evidence presented above, I believe that individuals 
high in the NFC are inherently predisposed to prefer rules more than their low NFC 
counterparts, I do not expect this preference to always facilitate rule learning. Rather, 
I predict that NFC’s role in the learning of rules will change according to whether the 
learning that is taking place is explicit or implicit. My specific hypotheses and their 
rationales are presented below. 




 Departing from the theoretical and empirical frameworks just discussed, I 
broadly hypothesized the existence of a relationship between the need for cognitive 
closure (NFC) and rule learning that is moderated by the type of learning (implicit 
versus explicit) taking place (Hypothesis 1). More specifically, I predicted that when 
they were aware that a rule existed, high NFC individuals would be more motivated 
than their low NFC counterparts to seek out and “seize” upon the structuring and 
ordering (and, thus, closure-providing) rule, resulting in better performance on an 
explicit rule learning task (Hypothesis 2). Conversely, I believed that a tendency for 
high NFC individuals to narrow their focus to the task at hand to the neglect of other 
aspects of their environment (i.e., succumb to “tunnel vision”) would interfere with 
their ability to absorb cues in their environment containing useful information about 
rules that they were not aware existed and that this would, in turn, result in worse 
performance on an implicit rule learning task (Hypothesis 3). I now turn to a 





Chapter 3: Overview of Studies 1 and 2 
Studies 1 and 2 both employed between-subjects designs, with the NFC and 
type of learning serving as the independent variables and performance in the testing 
phase of an AGL task serving as the dependent variable. Learning type was 
manipulated in both studies via instructional set (e.g., Reber, 1976), such that 
participants in the explicit conditions were informed that the letter strings they were 
going to be presented with in the learning phase would follow a set of rules, whereas 
participants in the implicit conditions were not provided with this information. 
Whereas, typically, in AGL studies contrasting implicit and explicit learning the 
instructional set not only informs participants in the explicit condition of the existence 
of rules but also strongly encourages participants to actively seek these rules out, I 
opted for a more minimal manipulation of explicit learning here. Because my 
hypothesis rests on the prediction that individuals high (vs. low) in the need for 
closure would be intrinsically more motivated to seek out rules, I wanted to observe 
the effect of the NFC on explicit learning in the absence of the introduction of an 
external motivation. Thus, the manipulation employed here consisted of simply 
informing participants in the explicit conditions of the existence of rules governing 
the letter strings they were about to be shown. 
Learning of the rules from which the letter strings were generated was 
assessed in a subsequent testing phase, during which participants were asked to 
classify novel letter strings as either ruleful or non-ruleful. The proportion of correct 
responses was calculated and served as the dependent variable of interest. In Study 1, 




manipulated as a transient state variable. A full description of both studies’ 






Chapter 4: Study 1 – The Need for Closure as a Trait Variable 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 72 University of Maryland undergraduate students enrolled in a 
lower level psychology course participated in the study in exchange for extra course 
credit. Of these, five were omitted from the final analysis: four for scoring too highly 
on the five-item lie scale contained within the Webster and Kruglanski (1994) NFC 
scale and one because she informed the experimenter that she was dyslexic. This 
resulted in a final N of 67 participants. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 22, with a mean age of 19.03 (SD = 
1.00). Forty-one (61.2%) were female, while 26 (38.8%) were male. As there were no 
significant main or interactive effects of gender or age on the independent variable of 
interest, neither will be discussed further. 
Materials 
Twenty-seven letter strings ranging in length from three to seven characters 
were generated from Reber’s (1967) grammar schematic, shown in Figure 1. 
Although some studies that have utilized this particular grammar schematic have 
included letter strings as long as eight letters, pilot testing revealed that participants 
struggled considerably with the learning phase task when letter strings of this length 
were included, therefore I decided to limit the length of strings to seven letters. Of 




remaining seven were reserved for use in the testing phase. Learning phase strings 
were paired together such that (a) longer strings were paired with shorter strings and 
(b) one string in each set began with each of the two possible starting letters (T or V). 
The ordering of these pairings was randomly determined and fixed across participants 








Figure 1. Grammar schematic used to generate ruleful letter strings (from Reber,  
1967). 
 
For the testing phase, thirteen non-ruleful letter strings were combined with 
the seven remaining ruleful letter strings for a total set of 20 letter strings (see 
Appendix B). Like the ruleful letter strings, the non-ruleful letter strings also ranged 
in length from three to seven characters and were fashioned from the letters, V, P, X, 
S, and T. The ordering of these 20 letter strings was randomly determined and fixed 
across participants. All letter strings were individually printed on 4”x6” index cards 





Participants were randomly assigned to either the explicit or implicit learning 
condition (32 and 35 participants, respectively) and completed the experiment one at 
a time. Prior to beginning the AGL task, each participant completed the NFC scale, 
followed by the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). The PANAS was used as a mind-clearing filler activity.  
The experimenter then read instructions to the participant for the learning 
phase of the AGL task. The learning type manipulation was embedded in these 
instructions, with the script for the explicit learning condition reading as follows:  
“I am now going to show you 20 cards, one at a time, for 20 seconds each. 
Each card has a string of letters on it. Each of these letter strings adheres to 
the same specific set of rules. After showing you two cards in a row, I’m 
going to ask you to wait 20 seconds and then repeat back to me, in the order 
they were shown, both letter strings. If you repeat any part of either string 
incorrectly, or reverse their order, I will show you the two cards again, in the 
same way as before, and you will be asked to try again. Once you have 
correctly remembered that pair of cards, we will move on to the next pair.”  
The instructions for the implicit learning condition differed slightly from the 
above instructions in that the line, “Each of these letter strings adheres to the same 
specific set of rules”, was omitted. Thus, whereas in the explicit condition 
participants were made aware of the fact the letter strings they were going to be 
shown were governed by a specific set of rules, participants in the implicit condition 




 All participants, after listening to their condition-specific instructions, 
completed the same two-phase task. During the first phase, the learning phase, 
participants were shown a series of 20 cards, one at a time, for 20 seconds each. After 
being shown two cards in a row, participants waited 20 seconds and then repeated 
back to the experimenter the letter strings on each of the two immediately preceding 
cards. Participants had to accurately recall each pair of letter strings before they were 
allowed move on to the next pair. The number of attempts it took participants to 
correctly recall each pair was recorded by the experimenter. 
After working through all 10 pairs (20 cards, total) in this manner, participants 
in the implicit condition were informed that each of the letter strings they had just 
been asked to memorize followed a specific set of rules. They were not told what 
these rules were but were asked to provide their best guess as to what these rules 
might be. This question served as a manipulation check to ensure that for participants 
in the implicit learning condition, any knowledge gleaned from exposure to the rule-
governed stimuli remained at an inarticulable (i.e., implicit) level. That is, the purpose 
of this question was to verify that participants in the implicit learning condition were 
not becoming consciously aware of the rules, which would violate one of the three 
definitional requirements of implicit learning previously discussed. 
At this same juncture, participants in the explicit condition were reminded of 
the existence of rules governing the letter strings and were also asked to provide their 
best guess as to what these rules might be. In both conditions, participants’ responses 
were recorded by the experimenter, which marked the end of the learning phase and 




At the beginning of the testing phase, all participants were read the following 
instructions: 
“Okay, now I’m going to show you 20 more cards. For each card, please tell 
me whether you think the letter string on the card is ruleful or non-ruleful. If 
you think that it is ruleful, say “yes.”  If you think that it is not, say “no.” You 
don’t have to know the rules that the letter strings do or don’t follow, just give 
me your best guess.” 
Participants were then presented with the 20 testing phase letter strings, one at a time, 
and asked to classify each letter string as ruleful or non-ruleful. Participants were 
given an unlimited amount of time to respond to each card. The proportion of strings 
correctly categorized was calculated for each participant and served as the dependent 
variable of interest. 
 Following the completion of the testing phase, participants answered a short 




As previously discussed, the implicitness of any rule learning that took place 
was assessed at the conclusion of the learning phase by asking participants what they 
thought the rules governing the letter strings they had just been shown might be. 
Participant responses were coded (blind to condition) into one of five categories: (1) 
no guess (many participants simply stated “no idea” or “no guess”), (2) incorrect 




hard and fast decision rule (e.g., “a lot ended in VS and VPS”), (4) correct decision 
rule nonetheless unhelpful for distinguishing between non-ruleful and ruleful testing 
phase strings (e.g., “only five letters used, V, P, S, X, and T”), and (5) correct 
decision rule that could conceivably have improved the participant’s performance in 
the testing phase (e.g., “all ended in S”). Because many participants offered multiple 
guesses of varying quality, only the “best” guess for each participant was coded. 
Twenty-one participants (31.3%) offered no guess at all. Twenty-seven 
participants (40.3%) provided guesses that were incorrect. Seven participants (10.4%) 
provided correct guesses that did not constitute decision rules. Six participants (9.0%) 
provided correct decision rules that were nonetheless unhelpful for the testing phase. 
And six participants (9.0%) provided correct decision rules that could have 
conceivably been helpful for distinguishing between ruleful and nonruleful strings 
presented in the testing phase.  
Ultimately, for the purposes of the manipulation check, I was only interested 
in participants who fell into the latter category. Of the six participants that articulated 
such helpful, ruleful guesses, two had been assigned to the implicit condition. 
Consequently, these participants were removed from further analysis. Providing such 
a “helpful” guess was not required of participants in the explicit condition in order to 
prove explicit learning, as task instructions provided awareness of the rules, which 





Learning Phase Performance 
For each participant, the average number of attempts taken to correctly recall 
each pair of learning phase letter strings was calculated. The mean of average 
learning phase attempts across all participants was 1.58 (SD = .41) per pair. A 
regression revealed no significant main effects of either NFC (centered) or learning 
type (dummy coded) on average learning phase attempts, b = .003 (SE = .003), t(62) 
= 1.11, p > .05, 
€ 
sr2  = .019 and b = -.130 (SE = .101), t(62) = -1.30, p > .05, 
€ 
sr2  = 
.026, respectively. 
Regressing average learning phase attempts on NFC (centered), learning type 
(dummy coded) and the interaction between the two revealed a marginally significant 
NFC-learning type interaction, b = -.011 (SE = .006), t(61) = -1.99, p = .051, 
€ 
sr2  = 
.058. The calculation of the simple slopes for NFC within each learning type level 
revealed this to be driven by the positive and significant relationship between NFC 
and average learning phase attempts within the implicit learning condition, b = .009 
(SE = .004), t(61) = 2.21, p < .05, 
€ 
sr2  = .120; NFC did not significantly predict 
average learning phase attempts in the explicit learning condition, b = -.002 (SE = 
.004), t(61) = -.60, p > .05, 
€ 
sr2  = .014. Average learning phase attempts did not 
predict testing phase performance, b = -.057 (SE = .041), t(63) = -1.38, p > .05, 
€ 
sr2  = 
.029. 
Testing Phase Performance 
 The proportion of correctly categorized testing phase strings served as the 




(centered) and learning type (dummy coded) revealed a significant main effect of 
learning type, b = .079 (SE = .032), t(62) = 2.45, p < .05, 
€ 
sr2  = .087. There was no 
significant main effect of NFC, b = .001 (SE = .001), t(62) = 1.00, p > .05, 
€ 
sr2  = 
.015.  
I next investigated the existence of an interaction between NFC and learning 
type in predicting testing phase performance by regressing testing phase performance 
on NFC (centered), learning type (dummy coded) and the interaction between the 
two. The interaction was significant, b = .006 (SE = .002), t(61) = 3.21, p < .01, 
€ 
sr2  = 
.130, providing support for Hypothesis 1. 
I further probed this interaction by calculating the simple slopes of NFC 










Figure 2. Simple slopes of NFC as a predictor of testing phase performance within  





As expected, within the explicit learning condition, an increase in NFC  
predicted better testing phase performance, b = .004 (SE = .001), t(61) = 3.03, p < .05, 
€ 
sr2  = .278. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was also supported. Although the relationship 
was in the hypothesized negative direction, NFC did not significantly predict testing 
phase performance in the implicit condition, b = -.002 (SE = .001), t(61) = 1.53, p > 
.05, 
€ 
sr2  = .059. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
Discussion 
 The findings of Study 1 provide empirical support for two of my three 
hypotheses. There was a significant interaction between NFC and learning type in 
predicting testing phase performance, thus the relationship between the NFC and rule 
learning does appear to be moderated by the implicit versus explicit nature of the 
learning taking place. The simple effect of the NFC within the explicit learning 
condition was also significant and in the predicted direction, such that a higher NFC 
predicted better performance. However, the simple effect of the NFC within the 
implicit learning condition, though in the predicted negative direction, was not 
significant.  
There was an interesting secondary finding worthy of mention – a marginally 
significant interaction between the NFC and learning type in predicting learning 
phase performance that was driven by a significant, positive relationship between the 
NFC and average learning phase attempts in the implicit learning condition. That is, it 
appears that in the implicit rule learning condition, individuals high in the NFC 
struggled more than their low NFC counterparts with recalling the letter strings they 




Nonetheless, because learning phase performance was not predictive of testing 
phase performance, this finding (though intriguing and perhaps deserving of future 
research) was deemed to be inconsequential for the hypotheses being tested and was 













Chapter 5:  Study 2 – The Need for Closure as a State Variable 
Study 2 was a conceptual replication Study 1, differing only in its 
operationalization of the need for closure. Whereas in Study 1 the NFC was measured 
as a trait variable, in Study 2 it was manipulated as a state variable. This resulted in a 
2 (Type of Learning: Implicit, Explicit) X 2 (NFC: High, Low) factorial design.  
The NFC was manipulated at the beginning of the study’s procedure, prior to 
the start of the AGL task, via a variation of the enjoyable subsequent task technique 
(e.g., Webster, 1993a), which involves informing participants that a (presumably) 
more enjoyable task follows the one they are presently engaged in. Participants were 
told either that they would be completing (a) a memory task followed by a personality 
test for which they would paint with watercolors (High NFC), or (b) two similar 
memory tasks (Low NFC). I opted for the enjoyable subsequent task manipulation 
over other more widely used NFC manipulations such as time pressure and cognitive 
load in order to avoid the potential alternative explanation that any effects found 
might be the result of the manipulation in and of itself interfering with the learning 
process (e.g., cognitive load impeding the ability to process the information at a 
deeper level), either in addition to or entirely apart from, the manipulation’s impact 
on the NFC. 
Methods 
Participants 




in a lower level psychology course participated in the study in exchange for extra 
course credit. Of these, three were omitted from the final analysis: one for suspicious 
responding, another because she informed the experimenter that she was dyslexic, 
and the final one for suspected cheating (typing the letter strings into a handheld 
mobile device) during the learning phase memory task. This resulted in a final N of 
114. 
Participants ranged in age from 16 to 40, with a mean age of 19.21 (SD = 
2.45). Seventy-seven (67.5%) were female and 36 (31.6%) were male, with gender 
information missing for one participant. As there were no significant main or 
interactive effects of gender or age on the independent variable of interest, neither 
will be discussed further. 
Materials 
AGL task materials were identical to those used in Study 1. To increase the 
believability of the High NFC manipulation, water coloring kits and a cup containing 
water and paintbrushes were placed on a table next to participants assigned to the 
High NFC conditions. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly distributed among the four experimental 
conditions (High NFC, Explicit Learning; Low NFC, Explicit Learning; High NFC, 
Implicit Learning; Low NFC, Implicit Learning) and completed the experimental 





 The NFC manipulation was administered at the beginning of the study 
procedure. Participants in the High NFC condition were told, “You’re going to be 
completing two tasks. The first task is a two-part memory and learning task. The 
second task is a personality task that will involve painting with watercolors. We’ll 
begin the first task now.” Participants in the Low NFC condition were told, “You’re 
going to be completing two tasks. Both are similar two-part memory and learning 
tasks. We’ll begin the first task now.” All participants then completed the same two-
part AGL task and accompanying implicit/explicit manipulation check as in Study 1. 
 Because deception was employed to heighten NFC, participants also 
completed a suspicion check (“Is there anything about this study that strikes you as 
odd? If so, what?”) after the conclusion of the testing phase. They then completed a 




Participant responses to the manipulation check were analyzed in the same 
way as in Study 1. Forty-seven participants (41.2%) offered no guess at all. Twenty-
nine participants (25.4%) provided guesses that were incorrect. Twenty-seven 
participants (23.7%) provided correct guesses that did not constitute decision rules. 
Nine participants (7.9%) provided correct decision rules that were nonetheless 
unhelpful for the testing phase. And, most importantly for the purposes of the 
manipulation check, two participants (1.8%) provided correct decision rules that 




ruleful strings presented in the testing phase. One of these two participants was in an 
implicit learning condition, and thus was removed from further analyses. 
Suspicion Check 
The suspicion check was aimed at ensuring that the High NFC participants 
believed that they would be water coloring after the AGL task. No participant 
reported being suspicious of this cover story. 
Learning Phase Performance 
Average learning phase attempts across all participants was 1.53 (SD = .36). A 
two-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effects of either NFC or learning type 
on average learning phase attempts, F(1,109) = .03, p > .05,  = .000 and F(1,109) 
= .117, p > .05,  = .001, respectively, and no significant interaction between the 
two independent variables, F(1,109) = .07, p > .05,  = .001. As in Study 1, average 
learning phase attempts was not a significant predictor of testing phase performance, 
b = -.003 (SE = .031), t(111) = -.095, p > .05, 
€ 
sr2  = .000. 
Testing Phase Performance 
The general pattern of means for testing phase performance across all four 
conditions was as predicted (see Figure 3). A two-way ANOVA revealed a 
marginally significant interaction between NFC and learning type, F(1,109) = 3.29, p 
= .07,  = .029. I tested Hypotheses 2 and 3 within the framework of a one-way 
ANOVA via planned comparisons between the High and Low NFC conditions within 
















High NFC/Explicit (M = .55, SD = .10) and Low NFC/Explicit (M = .53, SD = .11) 
conditions was not significant, t(109) = .552, p > .05, d = .150. However, the contrast 
between the High NFC/Implicit (M = .45, SD = .11) and Low NFC/Implicit (M = .51, 
SD = .13) conditions was significant, t(109) = 2.316, p < .05, d = .519, providing 













Figure 3. Testing phase performance means by condition. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 provide support for one of my three hypotheses. The 
contrast between High and Low NFC within the implicit learning level was 




significantly better on the implicit learning task than their High NFC counterparts. 
Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported. However, the contrast between High and Low 
NFC within the explicit learning level was not significant, and the overall interaction 
between NFC and learning type was only marginally significant, failing to provide 






Chapter 6:  Average Effect Sizes Across Studies 
To investigate the findings of both studies taken together, the Cohen’s d’s of 
the three hypothesized effects – (1) the interaction between the need for closure and 
learning type in predicting rule learning, (2) the need for closure’s effect on explicit 
rule learning, and (3) the need for closure’s effect on implicit rule learning – were 
averaged (weighted by sample size) across the two studies (see Table 1). The average 
interaction effect and average explicit effect were both small, d = .241 and d = .274, 
respectively. The average implicit effect was small-to-medium, d = .390. 
 
Table 1. Summary of effect sizes and corresponding sample sizes across Studies 1 
and 2. 
 
        Study 1      Study 2         Weighted Average 
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    d     N   d     N                d 
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Interaction           .363    65           .166         113            .241 
 
Explicit           .620          32               .150          58            .274 
 





Chapter 7:  General Discussion 
 The research presented here investigated the previously unexplored 
intersection of the need for cognitive closure and implicit and explicit rule learning. 
Drawing upon the theoretical frameworks and empirical findings of the two research 
domains in isolation from one another, I posited the existence of a relationship 
between the need for closure and rule learning that is moderated by the 
implicitness/explicitness of the learning transpiring. 
Because a high NFC is associated with a desire for order and structure, 
predictability, and lack of ambiguity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), I hypothesized 
that individuals high (vs. low) in the NFC would perform better on an explicit rule 
learning task, presumably due to a heightened motivation to seek out the structuring, 
ordering, and thus closure-providing rules. Conversely, I hypothesized that a 
predisposition towards tunnel vision and, consequently, a failure to absorb/attend to 
informative cues in their environment would cause high (vs. low) NFC individuals to 
perform worse on an implicit rule learning task where they were not aware a rule 
existed. This prediction of NFC’s opposite relationship to the two types of learning 
was congruent with existing evidence (e.g., Reber, Walkenfeld, & Hernstadt, 1991; 
Abrams & Reber, 1988; Witt, Nuhsman, & Deuschf, 2002; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) 
of a dissociation of the implicit and explicit learning processes. 
Taken as a whole, results from the two studies presented here appear to 
provide support for my three hypotheses. However, given the inconsistencies between 
the studies, these findings cannot be considered conclusive. My overall hypothesis 




type of learning (implicit vs. explicit) was supported fully by the findings of Study 1, 
but only tenuously by the findings of Study 2 (via a marginally significant 
interaction). My more specific, directional hypotheses that high (vs. low) NFC would 
predict better performance on an explicit rule learning task but worse performance on 
an implicit rule learning task were each supported in one study (Studies 1 and 2, 
respectively), but neither was supported across both studies.  
It is not clear what caused the discrepancies between the findings of my two 
studies. One possibility is that the NFC manipulation employed in the second study 
did not affect participants in the way I had intended. Future research might seek to 
test my hypotheses using an alternative manipulation of the need for closure. It is also 
possible that participants expected a roughly fifty-fifty split of ruleful/non-ruleful 
strings in the testing phase and that the nearly two-to-one ratio of non-ruleful to 
ruleful strings led to the biasing of participants’ responses. Although I cannot think of 
a good reason for why systematic bias of this sort would have produced the pattern of 
inconsistent findings observed, it nonetheless might have introduced noise into the 
data that obscured some effects. Future research might also explore whether different 
effects are observed when participants in the explicit condition are not merely 
informed of the existence of the rules but strongly encouraged by the experimenter 
(i.e., externally motivated) to seek them out.  
Ultimately, I believe that additional research into the role of the need for 
closure in implicit and explicit rule learning is warranted not only by the 
inconclusiveness of the findings presented here but also by the foundational nature of 




present research be more firmly established, it would provide considerable insight 






Learning Phase Letter Strings 
 
1a) VXXVPS 
  b) TPTXVS 
2a) VXXVS 
  b) TPPPTS 
3a) TPTXVPS 
  b) VVPS 
4a) VVS 
  b) TTXXXVS 
5a) TPPTS 
  b) VVPXXVS 
6a) VXVPS 
  b) TPTXXVS 
7a) TTXXVPS 
  b) VXVS 
8a) TTS 
  b) VVPXVPS 
9a) TPPPTS 






Testing Phase Letter Strings 
 
1) VSVS    11) VXS 
2) TTXVS*   12) VVPTVPS 
3) XXXTVS   13) VVPXXS 
4) VXVPXVS*   14) VVPXVS* 
5) TSTS    15) TTS 
6) VXPVXS   16) PTSTPP 
7) TPXTS    17) TPPTXVS* 
8) TPPPPTS*   18) VVVPS 
9) VXXXXVS*   19) TPTS* 
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